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Abstract 
A general and strategic effect of EU’s Association Agreements and DCFTAs with Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine has been the extension of the concept of Europe and its wider opening to 
neighborhoods and margins. It is on this basis that a European normative order can be 
differentiated from both the ‘Russian world’ and Eurasian geopolitical space. However this paper 
argues that the process of association is not a unilateral move, but a multilateral and reciprocal 
development; it is a way for Europe to know more about itself, and to politically redefine itself. 
The neighbourhood policy causes controversial effects on the EU. On the one hand, it 
consolidates the liberal-minded groups within European societies eager to see the EU as a 
promoter of values of freedom and civic liberties to be projected eastwards and defended in EU’s 
neighborhood. On the other hand, the problems of practical implementation tend to solidify 
sceptical groups in both the EU and its associated neighbours that contest not only the deepening 
of EU’s engagement with Ukraine, but EU’s normative project as a whole. The implementation of 
the joint strategy of the EU and its close neighbours faces a challenge of finding a proper balance 
between two dominant – yet to a large extent contradictory – approaches. One consists of 
capitalizing on these countries’ status as victims of Russia’s policies, countries whose very 
existence is under threat, which implies support and help from the EU. Another, requiring much 
more consistent efforts, is for the associated neighbouring states to emerge as positive 
showcases of transition, and useful partners contributing not only to the transformation process 
in post-Soviet area, but also to EU’s and NATO’s security. The recent three years made clear that 
the former alone does not guarantee to Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova a fully-fledged European 
voice. 
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Eastern Borderlands as Europe-Makers: 
(How) Can neighbours redefine the EU? 
Andrey Makarychev 
19 April 2017 
Introduction 
The current academic scholarship is replete with analysis of ways and means of EU policies of 
fostering institutional, societal, legal, economic and other changes in Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) countries1. Much less is known about whether these countries themselves may – 
directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally – contribute to transforming the EU, and 
if so, in what ways? Can they assist in a better self-understanding of what the EU is and 
should be in future? What issues pertinent to EU’s agenda do the EaP countries raise, and 
what policy repercussions do the ensuing debates have? 
In this paper I start with the presumption that political “discourses are influential in part 
because they are produced in both the power centers and the power margins”.2 This is of 
particular relevance to communicative situations in which policy actors with unequal status 
are involved, which usually makes us presume that it is the stronger ones that exert influence 
upon their weaker partners or interlocutors. Yet this logic should be readjusted to inter-
subjective interactions in which the presumably weaker actors do have a potential to affect 
the power holders, though not necessarily in the desired direction and with favourable 
upshots. 
In this context, the concept of marginality can be used as an analytical tool to uncover 
complexities of center-periphery relations in Europe. Margins and peripheries are usually 
treated as dependent territories destined to resign themselves to their secondary role and 
status in relations of domination imposed upon them. Yet margins might be discussed as 
subjects of their own, possessing not only their identities, but also their ability to re-signify 
their geographical remoteness from power centers, produce authentic cultural messages and 
thus contribute to the social construction of non-binary logics of inclusion. To put it 
differently, non-central actors possess meaningful cultural and symbolic resources that trigger 
                                                        
 The author is indebted to Yulia Kurnyshova who in her capacity as an expert of Ukrainian Institute of 
Strategic Studies and then as program coordinator at ‘Paсt’, Inc., from Odessa in 2012 to Kyiv in 2017, has 
qualitatively improved my understanding of Ukrainian politics. 
1  Gustav Gressel. Keeping Up Appearances: How Europe Is Supporting Ukraine’s Transformation. 
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 5, 2016 (http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/ 
16616). 
2 Merje Kuus. Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement. Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007, p. 8. 
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concomitant intense political dynamics on the margins that might be reluctant to accept the 
core speaking for them; moreover, they may try to define the nature of the core itself3.  
As the historical experiences of some borderlands – for example, the Baltic states - 
demonstrates, they might “not simply adopt and learn, but also strategically appropriate 
Western narratives”4, and this perspective can be projected to other margins, through in a 
different way. In this sense, being a geographical periphery for the EU, Ukraine can in some 
respects be viewed as a central issue for European normative and security orders: “Ukraine 
has become a key country in the security architecture of modern Europe”5. Ukraine, as many 
believe, is a frontline in the new confrontation between Russia and the West, “literally it is an 
incubator of the future for the West.  Without Ukraine, the West will lose its historical 
borders. The heart of Europe is beating in Ukraine today”.6 However, Ukraine’s geopolitical 
position giving it “a pivotal role in determining the contours of Europe and Eurasia”7 turned 
into a tragic loss of territory and lives for Ukraine whose very integrity is at stake. 
From the perspective of this analysis, the story of the Association Agreements (AA) is a story 
about the EU itself that to a large extent is affected by its own creatures – the EaP and its 
long-term regional reverberations. As seen from this angle, the process of association is not a 
unilateral move, but multilateral and reciprocal development; it is an opportunity for Europe 
to know more about itself, and to politically redefine itself. To put it simply, a successful 
experience of AAs would ultimately be a great boost to EU normative identity that otherwise 
might be in decline due to many factors. Under this scenario, AA countries might be one of 
few sources of inspiration for the idea of Europe that is heavily challenged from within the 
EU, with Brexit and the rise of right-wing parties all across the continent as major landmarks 
of these appeals to the “good old times of nation states”. In the meantime, a failure of the 
AAs would augment Eurosceptic attitudes within the EU and give more reasons/grounds to 
‘Putin understanders’ who simply don’t believe in the utility of politically or financially 
investing into Ukraine, as well as Moldova and Georgia.  
In this paper I mostly focus on the case of Ukraine, though I discuss it in a wider context of 
EaP that includes other AA countries. I distinguish between two possible ways of researching 
the effects of EU neighbours’ impact upon the EU. There is, firstly, a structural type of 
influence that basically can be approached from a geopolitical perspective and includes 
                                                        
3 Noel Parker. A Theoretical Introduction: Spaces, Centers, and Margins, in Noel Parker (ed.) The 
Geopolitics of European Identity: Centers, Boundaries, and Margins.  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 3-23.  
4 Merje Kuus. Op.cit. p.113. 
5 Oleksandr Tytarchuk et al. Ukraine as a Battleground for the Future of Europe. East European Security 
Research Initiative, August 22, 2016 (http://eesri.org/2016/08/ukraine-as-a-battleground-for-the-future-
of-europe/). 
6 Global Ukrainians plan to introduce Ukraine as a modern country. Renaissance Foundation, July 14, 2015, 
http://www.irf.ua/en/allevents/news/global_ukrainians_predstavit_ukrainu_svitovi_yak_modernu_krainu/ 
7 Catherine Wanner. ‘Fraternal nations’ and challenges to sovereignty in Ukraine: The politics of linguistic 
and religious ties, American Ethnologist. Journal of the American Ethnological Society, 41 (3), August 2014, 
p. 437. 
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systemic implications of the conflict in Russia-Ukraine relations for the EU. In this respect the 
Russia-inspired hostilities in Ukraine, being intrinsic elements in the structure of European 
security, inevitably affect EU’s international subjectivity. Secondly, within this structural logic 
of security interdependence Ukraine has space for enacting its own European subjectivity 
and, consequently, exerting some influence upon the EU. Evidently, this influence is not 
automatic, depends on Ukraine’s communicative and soft power resources and may cause 
controversial effects. In my analysis I focus only on public and thus visible forms of influence, 
leaving aside diplomatic activity that undoubtedly constitutes an important, yet much less 
observable, channel in Ukraine-EU communication. 
1. Structural Features: Can Margins Be Central? 
The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has shifted EU’s international role identity from a 
model of “good governance” to securitization of a plethora of domestic and external issues. 
The crisis that erupted in 2014 has significantly contributed to – though, of course, was not 
the sole cause for – a gradual transition from a Europe of post-political / technocratic “escape 
from history” to an EU where security policies and concerns dominate its policy agenda. In 
this sense, events in Ukraine, being part of a wider set of conflictual developments at EU’s 
eastern borders, have seriously questioned the most important characteristics of EU project 
as expansionist (if not imperial8), highly normative9 (even value-laden), and grounded in the 
logic of governmentality10 (a concept developed by the French political philosopher Michel 
Foucault to denote a managerial type of power that does not impose itself but rather creates 
conditions for development11).   
Nowadays, with the current conflict heavily affecting Ukraine, as well as all the EaP area, none 
of these characteristics should be taken for granted. Enlargement is out of question for the 
foreseeable future; liberal norms are often under question, and good governance, being an 
effective tool in peaceful times, does not bring expected results in situations of military 
confrontation. Moreover, the increased securitization of the EU foreign policy agenda does 
not necessarily pave the way for a better understanding of Ukraine’s insecurities: in the 
security area the EU and Ukraine often speak different languages. Ukraine’s extension of the 
definition of terrorism to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas does not resonate in the EU: the 
EU 2016 report mentioned only North Africa, the Middle East, the Western Balkans and 
                                                        
8 Angelos Sepos. Imperial power Europe? The EU’s relations with the ACP countries, Journal of Political 
Power 6 (2), 2013, pp. 261-287.  
9 Tobias Lenz. EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits, Cooperation and 
Conflict 48 (2), 2013, pp. 211-228. 
10 Jason Weidner. Governmentality, Capitalism, and Subjectivity, Global Society 23 (4), October 2009, pp. 
387-411. 
11  Wanda Vrasti. Universal but not truly ‘global’: governmentality, economic liberalism, and the 
international, Review of International Studies 39, 2013, p.52. 
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Turkey as EU partners around the world with whom Brussels intends “to share best practices 
and develop joint programmes on countering violent extremism and radicalization”12.   
Therefore, the results so far of the securitizing momentum in the EU are far from Ukraine’s 
expectations. Securitization led to a further fragmentation within the EU, a process rooted in 
a bunch of factors beyond Ukraine, yet to a large extent stimulated by the crisis in Moscow-
Kyiv relations. The most visible manifestation of this fragmentation was the Dutch 
referendum of 2016 that challenged the very idea of EU-based consolidated policy towards 
Ukraine. There were other symptoms of Ukraine-wary attitudes as well, including the fear of 
immigrants from conflict-affected areas, the possible scale of assistance package to this 
country, and, evidently, the skeptical appraisal of the tempo and upshots of domestic reforms 
indispensable for rearticulating Ukraine’s European identity.  
And, of course, the Russia factor plays a key role in this fragmentation. Disagreements 
between Poland and Germany over Ukraine policy might be a good illustration of the 
divergence of EU member states’ eastern policies: “Polish officials are concerned that 
Germany is too keen to end the conflict in Ukraine on Russia's terms, and is reluctant to 
impose tougher economic sanctions on Russia and to shift NATO forces to the east”13. 
For many in Europe Ukraine’s suffering from Russia’s policy is a deeply regrettable, but mostly 
a foreign policy issue. From here stems another effect of the crisis, namely the diverse 
attempts to redefine Europe’s boundaries through detaching Ukraine from European 
normative and institutional order, apparently through the idea of constructing a “wider 
Europe”. The recognition of Moscow’s guilt in fuelling the conflict with Kyiv did not 
automatically translate into the acceptance of Ukraine as a fully-fledged member of European 
security order deserving protection, which questions the centrality of this conflict for the 
entire Europe. This narrative of detachment obviously contravenes the idea of a normatively 
expanding Europe successfully projecting its power from center to periphery; in fact it implies 
that there are geographic limits to these projections.  
It is basically right-wing parties in some EU member states that took major advantage of this 
type of political mood and capitalized on Ukraine-skeptical attitudes within certain groups in 
their societies, transforming them into explicitly pro-Putin’s policies. Overt Russia sympathies 
exposed by Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy, UKIP in the United Kingdom, or Jobbik 
in Hungary are meant to challenge and ultimately destroy the normative core of the EU, and 
consequently come back to the “good old times” of nation states. Their efforts are conducive 
not only to avoidance of solidarity as a cornerstone of EU’s foreign policies, but – what is 
more – to de-facto acceptance of the idea of spheres of influence in the continent 
                                                        
12 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy. June 2016 (http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/ 
eugs_review_web.pdf). 
13  J.C. Disagreements over the EU’s Ostpolitik, The Economist, August 27, 2014 
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/08/poland-and-germany). 
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propagated by the Kremlin. Obviously, an implementation of the right-wing agenda would 
further relegate Ukraine into Russia’s zone of control, but whether this will materialize seems 
at least uncertain, or unlikely. 
With all these factors in mind, the Ukraine debate in the EU ultimately engendered “a crisis of 
European confidence”14: Europe became divided over its eastern policy and over the practical 
implementation of its normative power resources. The contradictions between different 
visions of Europe, to a large degree triggered by Russia’s force projection onto Ukraine, unveil 
different shapes of symbolic and cultural, but also institutional and political, borders of 
Europe. It seems likely that in these circumstances the EU struggling for its subjectivity would 
prefer to (re)define itself more in geopolitical – rather than normative – terms, with borders 
and fences, and, perhaps, more room for compromise with Russia on spheres of influence. It 
is due to the growing importance of geopolitical reasoning that the EU had to start 
rapprochement with Belarus in the absence of domestic reforms in this country, and pay 
scarce attention to the growing authoritarianism in Azerbaijan15. It is against the backdrop of 
these structural circumstances that in future Ukraine would have to develop its policies of 
boosting its European identity and subjectivity, dealing with an EU of the Dutch referendum 
(which had little to do with Ukraine as such), a Europe of Putin understanders, as well as a 
Europe of business-as-usual, pragmatic realignment rather than common values. Under this 
scenario EU’s foreign policy role will tend to decline16, which is far from Ukraine’s best 
interests. 
2. Ukraine’s European Agency 
It is in these structural circumstances that Ukraine develops its European policy that can be 
discussed within research framework set by Noel Parker, and then developed by Christopher 
Browning and George Christou17 who spoke about a number of “marginality strategies” that 
EU’s neighbors can put into practice. Three out of five on Parker’s original list – obtaining 
rewards for intermediation between Moscow and Brussels, playing one center off another 
and vice versa, and “manifest rejection” of EU offers as allegedly insufficient in comparison to 
                                                        
14  Andrej Novak. Europe without Borders 2025: Overcoming the EU neighborhood policy deadlock. 
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 14, 2015 (http://www.ecfr.eu/ 
article/commentary_europe_without_borders_2025_overcoming_the_eu_neighbourhood_3094?utm_co
ntent=buffer86aad&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer). 
15 Alina Inayeh et al. Regional Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis: Challenges for the Six Partnership 
Countries. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 9, 2014 
(http://www.gmfus.org/publications/regional-repercussions-ukraine-crisis-challenges-six-eastern-
partnership-countries). 
16 Angelos Chyssogelos. Creating a ‘multi-speed’ Europe would divide the EU and diminish it as a foreign 
policy actor. LSE Blog, April 5, 2017 (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/05/creating-a-multi-
speed-europe/?utm_content=buffer43e9a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_ 
campaign=buffer). 
17 Christopher Browning and George Christou. The constitutive power of outsiders: The European 
Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Dimension, Political Geography 29, 2010, 109-118. 
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what Moscow can bestow – are not any longer functional for Kyiv (although they may be 
more relevant to some other EaP states to which we return below). Apparently, it is only two 
other options – “manifest emulation” (or “selective appropriation” of EU’s characteristics) 
and expectation of loyalty rewards – that remain at the disposal of Ukrainian government.  
However, there are other ways that neighbours can raise their voices and speak up in 
relations with the EU. First, marginal and peripheral actors can generate demands for EU 
leadership and in this sense become strong discourse-makers. Although the EU as a “peace 
project” was not designed to tackle security issues and challenges, after the commencement 
of the Russian-Ukraine conflict Brussels became an object of multiple vociferous demands for 
leadership18 and for developing a strategy of assisting Ukraine in countering Russia’s creeping 
infiltration and violation of its borders19. The expectations of a strong EU reaction to the 
annexation of Crimea and Russia’s support for military insurgency in Donbas were based on 
the presumption that by the very structure of European security architecture Ukraine is 
destined to play a key role for both the EU and NATO. These claims to some extent might be 
paralleled with the case of Poland, whose then foreign minister Radek Sikorski in 2011 
famously claimed that he is more concerned about Germany’s inaction than Germany’s 
strength.  
Secondly, marginal actors are key to the drawing and redrawing of the boundaries of Europe – 
not necessarily in a geographic sense, but rather in terms of acceptance of neighbors’ citizens 
as legitimate travellers to the Schengen area. In this sense the visa waiver agreements with 
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine embody the idea(l) of open and inclusive Europe, where trust 
and solidarity prevails over national compartmentalization. 
Thirdly, non-central actors, with their high level of Euro-enthusiasm, are important sources of 
legitimizing the EU project that, as we know, is strongly challenged within some of EU 
member states. Nowadays the validity and vitality of Europeanization can be more 
appreciated by EU neighbors than in some of European capitals.  
Fourthly, Ukraine as a victim of Russia’s policies raises a number of questions quintessential 
for the whole Europe – for example, how to react to the breach of international norms of 
inviolability of borders? What are to be the consequences of the failure of the Budapest 
memorandum for the West? In this respect, the Moscow-supported separatism can be 
viewed as “the first direct conflict between the differing regional strategies of Russia and the 
EU, specifically Brussels’ Eastern Partnership and Moscow’s concept of a Eurasian Union. 
Ukraine has been central to both strategies, and the choice presented to Kyiv ultimately made 
the conflict inevitable”20. 
                                                        
18 Dmitry Trenin. As Ukraine stares into the abyss, where is Europe’s leadership? The Guardian, April 20, 
2014 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/20/ukraine-stares-abyss-europe-leadership 
19 Ian Bond. Contested Space: Eastern Europe between Russia and the EU. Center for European Reforms, 
March 2017 (http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/pb_eastern_part_IB_9march17.pdf). 
20 Nadezhda Arbatova and Alexandr Dynkin, World Order After Ukraine, Survival 58:1, p.78 (71-90)  
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Fifthly, the lessons learned from Ukraine are important for the entire Europe, which, as many 
experts deem, needs to be prepared for Russian military actions elsewhere on its periphery21. 
As promoters of this viewpoint in Ukrainian Foreign Ministry argue, “Ukraine is the first line of 
defense of Europe”22. In military sense there are voices that believe that NATO potentially 
benefits from Ukraine's experience in the war against Russia. In particular, the Ukrainian 
National Security and Defence Council and NATO set up a study centre on hybrid warfare to 
develop best practices arising from experiences fighting Russia that can be valuable to the 
alliance. 
Sixthly, Ukraine can contribute to some new dynamics at Europe’s margins. One of its visible 
signs is debate on the Intermarium concept. Along Andreas Umland’s lines, Ukraine, Baltic 
states, Poland and some other adjacent countries hypothetically may create an alliance to 
deter Russia: “This early twentieth-century plan could today take the form of an entente 
cordiale or mutual aid pact of the countries in between the Baltic and Black Seas. Such a bloc 
would be uniting those states that today perceive Moscow as a threat to their national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and core interests”23. Due to their geographic location and 
historical experiences, most of these states can’t ignore the recent developments in Ukraine 
and detach them from their own domestic debates and perceptions of security. This, in 
particular, is the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On the one hand, as Kremlin’s policy 
toward Ukraine made clear, they were right in repeatedly raising the issue of dangers of 
Russian expansionism, and urging their partners in Western Europe to be wary of Russian 
long-term intentions. On the other hand, the justified Baltic alarmism increased the sense of 
their vulnerability and reinforced traditional center-periphery structure of power within the 
EU and NATO, particularly exemplified by the pivotal roles of Germany, France, and the UK in 
strengthening Baltic states’ security24. 
However, Ukraine can do much more to generate a new political dynamic at Europe’s 
margins. Two regionalist perspectives are of particular salience in this respect. One would be 
to closely team up with the other most advanced EaP countries, based on previous examples 
of loosely institutionalized yet effective alliances of Central European states (the Visegrad 
‘V4’), or the Baltic States when they were on their ways to the EU. Studying and sharing 
success stories of each other is indispensable for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova 25, as well as 
                                                        
21 Ivan Medynskyi. What Ukraine Can Offer to NATO?  Kyiv: Institute of World Policy, December 15, 2015 
(http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1870.html). 
 22 Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze. Ukraine is Ready to Contribute into European and Euroatlantic Security, 
UA: Ukraine Analytica 3(5), 2006, pp. 3-6 (http://ukraine-analytica.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/journal_UA_Analytica_3_2016.pdf). 
23 Andreas Umland. Countering Russian expansionism: Blueprints for a new security alliance. ECFR 
Commentary, April 18 2016, (http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_countering_russian_ 
expansionism_blueprints_for_a_new_security_al). 
24 UK troops in Estonia to deter ‘Russia aggression’, BBC News, March 18, 2017, (http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-39311670?SThisFB). 
25 Leonid Litra. Moldova’s Success Story: the Visa-Free Regime with the EU One Year On. Kyiv: Institute of 
World Policy, May 20, 2015 (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1526.html). 
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finding a common language of speaking about security, though its articulation is only at the 
initial stage26.  
Another policy vector would be to beef up Ukraine’s interaction with neighboring EU member 
states. The EU Black Sea Synergy could be an important reference point for Ukraine’s 
European aspirations and efforts to boost its European credentials. Further on, the Institute 
of World Policy has advised the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry to enhance dialogue with Turkey, 
Romania and Georgia, to establish a mechanism of coordination between Ukraine, Poland 
and Romania in regional security matters, to develop positive experience of Ukrainian-
Romanian-Bulgarian armed brigade, and to think of Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan format of 
communication27. Important is regional cooperation in ensuring energy security, including 
creation of interconnectors within Eastern European gas hub between Ukraine, V4 counties 
and Romania28. 
Yet to make these discursive openings operational and therefore to become a crucial factor in 
European politics, Ukraine faces the necessity to mobilize its diplomatic, communicative and 
soft power resources. The structural factors that discussed above stipulate the inevitable 
(mostly negative) spill-over effects of events in Ukraine for the whole Europe, and do not 
automatically ensure Ukraine’s voice to be heard and role to be played in Europe.  
Of course, “Ukraine has not been a mere bystander waiting to see what is being offered. It 
has been actively and dynamically engaged”29 with the process of association, and builds its 
European strategy on a number of cornerstones: 
- to achieve a consensual understanding in EU member states of the conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia as an inherently European affair, which ultimately implies 
symbolically the detachment of Putin’s regime from Europe; 
- to acknowledge Ukraine’ victimhood, on the one hand, and devotion to the European 
idea, on the other; 
- to present the conflict as Ukraine’s battle for Europe as a whole, since Russia’s self-
assertive revisionism is a threat to the whole post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic institutional 
order30; 
- to engage the EU and its member states in conflict resolution directly on the ground 
and indirectly through sanctioning Russia. 
                                                        
26 Iulian Chifu et al. Prospective on Ukraine Crisis. A Trilateral Approach. Kyiv: Institute of World Policy, 
October 21, 2015 (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1776.html). 
27  Recommendations for Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Strategy. Kyiv: Institute of World Policy 
(https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7i_OSucRX5wajctU09HQ2x3c0k/view). 
28IWP Prepared a Memo Ahead of President Poroshenko’s Visit to Poland. Kyiv: Institute of World Policy 
Memo, November 30, 2016 (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/2190.html). 
29 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk. Ukraine between the EU and Russia. The Integration Challenge. 
Palgrave 2015, p.3. 
30 Ukraine’s Contribution to Regional Security: the Case of Transnistrian Conflict”. Policy Brief. Kyiv: 
Institute of World Policy, September 17, 2013 (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/891.html). 
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However, the EU appears to be a hard partner that needs to be continuously convinced to 
accept Ukraine’s agenda and accommodate Ukraine’s expectations and interests. Factors 
hampering the headway in this direction are multiple. For years the West showed only limited 
interest in Ukraine, putting a premium on relations with Russia; moreover, for many in Europe 
Ukraine was (mis)perceived more as a source of threats rather than an attractive country31. 
Today some authors speak about “Ukraine’s fatigue”, signalling diminishing enthusiasm about 
Ukraine’s future due to lack of much needed economic and institutional reforms in this 
country32. Some experts deem “that there are preconditions for Ukraine to be abandoned by 
the international community in exchange for the rapprochement with Russia”33.  
There have been many attempts by Ukrainian politicians to reach out to Western diplomats 
and make them change their stance on the Minsk agreements and other issues, yet with little 
success 34 . Appeals of Ukrainian experts to put into practice “a truly collaborative 
implementation of the good neighbourliness principle”35 and “to converge efforts to solve 
existing security crises” so far did not fully materialize either. 
Of particular sensitivity was the visa free issue negotiated between Kyiv and Brussels for 
years. The saga with visa talks was widely perceived in Ukraine as a story of the EU trying to 
drag on with practically implementing its own policies: as Ukraine’s deputy Foreign Minister 
Olena Zerkal’s confessed, “only constant pressure and the constant raising of this issue may 
force (the EU. – A.M.) to move forward… This is probably not diplomatic: we see complete 
impotence in the European Union, and in the European institutions” 36. Of course, the positive 
decision taken in April 2017 creates a much better context of relations between Kyiv and 
Brussels, yet the whole process was full of complications and betrayed serious impediments 
for Ukraine’s headway with Europeanization.     
On the EU side, it is Ukraine that faces communication problems being unable to counter the 
negative perception of this country in Europe37. The existence of the problem is duly 
understood within the Ukrainian political class as well: in the words of Hanna Hopko, “the 
problem is over all these years, the government of Ukraine has failed to create a platform 
                                                        
31 Paul D’Anieri. Ukrainian foreign policy from independence to inertia, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 45 , 2012, pp. 451-452 (447-456) 
32  Michael Meyer-Resende. Ukraine fatigue is spreading in Europe. Euroactiv, May 24, 2016 
(http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/ukraine-fatigue-is-spreading-in-europe/). 
33 Dionis Cenușă. Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova: Three Distinct Dialogues with the EU. IPN web site, 
September 26, 2016 (http://ipn.md/en/integrare-europeana/79201). 
34 Gustav Gressel. Op.cit.  
35 Roman Petrov. The EU Neighborhood Policies and the Security Crises within the Eastern Neighborhood, 
Security and Human Rights 25, 2014, p. 311.  
36  Rasmussen: Ukraine ‘Betrayed” by EU over visa deal, Euroactiv, December 7, 2016 
(http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/rasmussen-ukraine-betrayed-by-eu-over-visa-
deal/). 
37  Posol ES: Ukraina mae veliku problem s komunikatsieyu, Glavkom, December 22, 2016 
(http://glavcom.ua/news/posol-jes-ukrajina-maje-veliku-problemu-z-komunikacijeyu--389394.html). 
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that would be similar to Pinchuk’s so-called Yalta Forum. This field has been completely 
surrendered to the oligarchs who are using such events to whitewash their image and try to 
spread their influence”38. The reference to Viktor Pinchuk, a Ukrainian tycoon who has 
recently proposed an appeasing compromise with Russia, is meant to show the fragmentation 
of Ukraine’s foreign policy into several communicative channels, which undermines 
coherence of Kyiv’s diplomacy.   
These divergent perceptions only raise the importance of the interrelated concepts of 
communicative power39 and soft power for analysis of Ukraine’s attempts to install its 
European subjectivity and the ensuing ability to influence the EU and its member states. In 
this respect Ukrainian foreign policy community has some positive experience of producing 
discourses aimed to resonate in EU member states. This is particularly the case when it comes 
to the AA that is not only about technicalities – it is also a matter of communicative practices 
in the sense that the agreement has to be explained, and its major points have to be 
interactively discussed: how exactly DCFTA might be instrumental in fighting corruption, 
which sectors might be and might be not reformed using DCFTA, what would be Ukraine’s 
long-term strategy on EU membership perspective, how much Ukraine expects to get from 
the EU in financial terms, how the implementation process will be monitored40, how business 
climate in Ukraine will be changed for international investors, etc.41 In fact, there is an ample 
room for translating specific clauses of AA into a language usable for public debates and 
making Ukraine’s arguments stronger. The same goes for the visa issue: there is an important 
communicative dimension to the legal part of the process, which requires openly dispelling 
fears and concerns existing in some EU member states42. It is very important to be duly aware 
of the state of minds in the EU about Ukraine43, the EU’s expectations44, and areas of 
misunderstanding45. 
                                                        
38  Hanna Hopko. How to Nationalise Foreign Policy, Den’, March 7, 2017 
(https://day.kyiv.ua/en/article/topic-day/how-nationalize-foreign-policy). 
39 James Bohman. Democratising the Global Order: from Communicative Freedom to Communicative 
Power, Review of International Studies 36 (2), April 2010, 431-447. 
40 Leonid Litra. Monitoring and Evaluation of Association Agreement with the EU. Kyiv: World Policy 
Institute, January 27, 2016 (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1908.html). 
41 How to Explain EU-Ukraine Association Agreement? Kyiv: World Policy Institute, March 10, 2016 
(http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1964.html). 
42 Ten Fears of the Europeans: Why the EU Should Not Postpone the Introduction of the Visa-Free Regime 
with Ukraine. Kyiv: World Policy Institute, Communication Memo, June 15, 2016 
(http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/2072.html). 
43 Leonid Litra. The Approaches to the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. The Attitudes of France, Kyiv: Institute 
of World Policy, January 22, 2015, available at Italy and Spain (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1376.html). 
44 A Call to the EU – Time to Step In. Policy Brief.  Kyiv: Institute of World Policy, March 12, 2014 
(http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1008.html). 
45 Leonid Litra. Ukraine’s Concerns about the West. Policy Brief.  Kyiv: Institute of World Policy, November 12, 
2014 (http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1296.html). 
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A good example of Ukraine’s engagement with European debate is the report commissioned 
by the International Renaissance Foundation on possible impacts of DCFTA upon Dutch 
economy. It predicts that DCFTA will have a positive long-term effect on bilateral trade 
between the Netherlands and Ukraine: “We estimate that Dutch exports to Ukraine will 
nearly triple, from €1.5 billion to roughly €4.2 billion. Dutch imports from Ukraine are 
predicted to nearly double, from €0.7 to €1.3 billion. The overall impact on the Dutch 
economy is also positive, but small. Taking into account all direct and indirect effects on 
bilateral trade and trade with third countries, Dutch real GDP would increase by €177 million 
as a result of the DCFTA. This is equivalent to a growth rate of 0.03% with respect to the 2015 
GDP level”46. The report contains a proposal to more ambitiously define and practically 
implement the fundamental ENP principles, including that one of solidarity connoting a real 
joint response to common challenges and the recognition of the indivisibility of security of the 
partner countries and EU member states.47 
There is an important cultural dimension to Ukraine’s European subjectivity that might be 
seen through the concept of soft power. Unfortunately, due to the hostilities in the east, 
Ukraine was unable to host some pre-planned sportive mega events (such as European 
basketball championship48) that otherwise could have been used as a cultural playground to 
foster Ukraine’s identification with Europe and as a symbolic booster of its European identity. 
However, Jamala’s victory in the 2016 Eurovision song contest with an explicitly political song 
touching upon the deportation of Crimean Tatars under the Soviet rule was a public act of 
Ukraine’s soft power. Yet capitalizing on the acquired symbolic and cultural capital through 
hosting the Eurovision 2017 in Kyiv proved to be a hard task due to the widely publicized 
controversy with the Russian participant, the wheelchair-bound signer Yulia Samoylova, who 
was banned from entering Ukraine due to her previous concerts in the Russia-controlled 
Crimea. This case that in March 2017 sparked heated emotions in both Ukraine and Russia 
reflected – though in a cultural form – a political dilemma that Ukraine faces in Europe: 
should the recognition of Ukraine’s European subjectivity imply a conflict-free type of 
reconciliation with Russia, even at the expense of Ukraine’s legal norms and interests, or 
Kyiv’s intransigence on its territorial integrity should be accepted as part of Ukraine’s 
European identity. The Eurovision debate has metaphorically elucidated a deeply political 
issue: when it comes to normative matters, inclusion of Ukraine in Europe as a space of 
cultural production might often imply exclusion of Russia, which for many reasons can be 
contested by Ukraine’s European partners. As a local journalist rightly put it, “the poor 
communication abilities of Ukraine’s government structures come at no surprise. However, if 
                                                        
46 Impact of the EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement on the Dutch Economy. Kyiv: Renaissance Foundation, 
February 23, 2017 (http://www.irf.ua/en/allevents/news/impact_of_the_eu_ukraine_news/). 
47 Ukrainian experts call on the EU to substantially review the European Neighborhood Policy. Kyiv: 
Renaissance Foundation, June 23, 2015 (http://www.irf.ua/en/allevents/news/pereglyad_ 
evropeyskoi_politiki_susidstva_ochikuvannya_ukraini/). 
48  Ukraine lose Euro basketball host rights, June 13, 2014 (http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/ 
2014/06/13/ukraine-lose-euro-basketball-host-rights). 
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European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was not aware of Samoylova’s security threat to Ukraine, 
this doesn’t mean it’s not there”49. This dilemma only underlines the crucial importance of 
communicative dimensions of Ukraine’s policies: European reactions to the travel ban on 
Samoylova attested to insufficiency of references to legal norms for winning the information 
battle over the whole issue; what is needed is a consistent and well-articulated media and 
communication strategy capable of inducing sympathies – or at least understanding - among 
different European audiences.  
From a theoretical perspective, the debate leads us to the question of whether “the subaltern 
can speak”50; yet unlike Spivak I do answer this question affirmatively. The reasonable 
optimism in this respect is nurtured by the understanding of Europe as a political community 
that in many respects remains incomplete51, which can be understood in at least two 
interrelated senses. Incompleteness can be tantamount to impossibility of drawing ultimate 
borders of Europe and thus neatly differentiating it from non-Europe. By the same token, the 
idea can be reinterpreted as inclusive openness to embrace margins, and availability of spaces 
/ niches within Europe that non-central actors might wish to occupy. 
Such research optics leaves much room for discussing the intricacies of relations of 
representation embedded in the diverse conceptualizations of Europe. Indeed, the question 
of who represents Europe for EU’s neighbors remains structurally open, with Europe of 
institutions and norms (exemplified by the EU) being very different from a cultural 
understanding of Europe that is always open to various – and often arbitrary - interpretations 
(as in the case of Azerbaijan). In this sense the “empty place” of Europe can be occupied by 
the EU (in the case of AAs and DCFTAs), Germany as the most important driver behind the 
contemporary version of Ostpolitik, UEFA (in the case of Euro-2012 co-hosted by Ukraine and 
Poland), or EBU (in the case of Eurovision Song Contest).  
This variety of Europes implies different mechanisms of producing, but also controlling 
neighbors’ European subjectivity. In the meantime it also sets stage for diverse social, cultural 
and political landscapes that EU neighbors may wish to use for raising their visibility and 
credibility, and creating platforms for speaking positions to resonate in a wider Europe. 
Structurally it is mainly through these established nodal points that Ukraine and other 
neighbors can subjectify themselves as European actors. One way of doing so would be 
through pre-designed mechanisms that presuppose not only ‘victimisation’ but mostly 
‘showcasing’ (serious anti-corruption and economic liberalisation achievements in the case of 
AA, and the capability to host major cultural as in the case of the Eurovision song contest). Of 
                                                        
49  Alya Shanrda. EBU, Samoilova is a political candidate instrumentalized to threaten Ukrainian security, 
Euromaidan Press, April 3, 2017 (http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/04/03/ebu-this-is-how-russias-
banned-eurovision-contestant-poses-a-security-threat-to-ukraine/). 
50 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Can the Subaltern Speak? In Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds) 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London: Macmillan, 1988, pp. 66-111. 
51 I am thankful to Vlad Strukov, University of Leeds, for an interesting discussion on the ‘incompleteness’ 
of EU project during the Third ‘Eastern Platform’ seminar held in the University of Tartu, April 7, 2017 
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course, Ukraine can use these openings from the position of the EU’s subaltern, which in 
many respects is the case nowadays. However, the basic challenge is how to use various 
opportunities that the EU opens to Ukraine for articulating and constructing Ukraine’s 
European identity/subjectivity on its own terms, with its own legal provisions, its own 
memory politics and its own security agenda.  
3. Beyond Ukraine: Extending the Argument 
In this last section I will explore the possibilities of applying the arguments developed above 
for other EU neighbors. The visa waiver agreements with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine are 
important contributions to an expanded concept of the normative and institutional Europe 
that might also be seen as a step towards future inclusion of some of these countries into the 
Euro-Atlantic security order. However, obviously the EaP, embracing also Belarus, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan is unable to work similarly as a unifying policy mechanism. On the contrary, 
instead of a greater normative and institutional coherence within the group of six countries 
we see many lines of differentiation and conflict.  
Indeed, EaP countries represent different forms of hybrid political identities. For example, in 
Georgia the overwhelming majority of population is in favor of teaming up with the EU, while 
at the same time a comparable percentage favors a dialog with Russia. Yet two other cases 
are even more illustrative in this regard – Moldova (an EaP country where state institutions 
are geopolitically divided and where the AA/DCFTA implementation coexists with some kind 
of rapprochement with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union)52, and Armenia (a member 
of the Eurasian Economic Union that, in spite of Russia’s security tutorship, keeps open its 
relations with the EU and NATO). From a European perspective, these two cases attest to the 
growing fluidity and flexibility of Europe’s boundaries as an antidote to the Kremlin’s 
unacceptable proposal of fixing spheres of influence that the EU defies. A similar approach 
can be applied to Kazakhstan, a major post-Soviet country that generates its own hybridity 
and looks for a middle ground between constitutive engagement with the Eurasian Economic 
Union and “enhanced partnership and cooperation” with the EU. The eponymous agreement 
signed between Brussels and Astana in 2015 not only upgraded the level of communication 
between the two countries, but also made Kazakhstan a special interlocutor for the EU among 
the countries of the whole post-Soviet area.53 
This uncertainty with Europe’s borders, as a cumulative effect of both neighbors’ policies of 
self-assertion and EU’s own strategy of disproving the validity of geopolitical “big games”, 
apparently leaves much room for borderlands in constructing a Europe of their liking. 
Reshaping and influencing the Europe of EU institutions and norms from the positions of 
margins is a hard yet possible job. As the experience of Ukraine made clear, the chances of 
                                                        
52 Dionis Cenușă, Moldova forced to combine CIS and Eurasian Union with European integration, IPN web 
site, March 2017 (http://www.ipn.md/en/integrare-europeana/82943). 
53  Official Journal of the European Union L29, Volume 59, 4 February 2016, available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/enhanced_partnership_and_cooperation_agreement.pdf 
14  ANDREY MAKARYCHEV 
 
influencing and changing the way the EU operates can increase only with the gradual 
headway towards accepting the core ideas of European integration, its normative code of 
behavior. And vice versa – any regress in reforms decreases chances of being embraced by 
Europe as a fully-fledged speaker for the common agenda.  
Of course, one may claim that there is always another Europe of national(ist) identities, 
political traditionalism and conservatism, personified and symbolized by Viktor Orban and 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski. The problem is that in an illiberal Europe of nation states, as opposed to a 
Europe of shared liberal values, EaP countries would face bigger chances of being drawn into 
violent conflicts. The case of Kyiv’s relations with Warsaw, complicated by the most 
controversial issues of national memory politics, clearly attests to this unfortunate prospect.    
4. Conclusions 
A general and strategic effect of AAs and DCFTAs was the extension of the concept of the 
normative and institutional Europe and its wider opening to neighborhoods and margins. This 
extension, largely supported by EaP countries themselves, caused controversial effects on the 
EU. On the one hand, it consolidated the liberal-minded groups within European societies 
eager to see the EU as a promoter of values of freedom and civic liberties to be projected 
eastwards and defended in EU’s neighborhood. It is on this basis that European normative 
order can be differentiated from both the “Russian world” and Eurasian geopolitical space. 
On the other hand, the practical implementation of EaP has to some extent solidified the 
Ukraine-skeptic (if not anti-Ukrainian) groups that contest not only the deepening of EU’s 
engagement with Ukraine, but EU’s normative project as a whole. These latter attitudes move 
many of their sympathizers into Russia’s embrace. Similar Eurosceptic views are visible in 
other EaP countries as well (Moldova), and they perpetuate because of the continuous 
association of the EU with corruption scandals or political crises provoked by political forces 
declaratively acting in line with European values and principles (rule of law, democracy etc.).  
It is against this controversial backdrop that Ukraine and other EaP countries keep inscribing 
themselves in Europe. The implementation of this strategy faces a challenge of finding a 
proper balance between two dominant – yet to a large extent contradictory – policies. One is 
a policy of capitalizing on these countries’ status as victims of Russia’s policies, countries 
whose very existence is under threat, which implies support and help from the EU. Another – 
and requiring much more consistent efforts - policy is presenting AA countries as positive 
showcases of transition and useful partners capable of constructively contributing not only to 
transformation process in post-Soviet area, but also to EU’s and NATO’s security. The recent 
three years made clear that the policy of victimhood alone does not guarantee to Ukraine, 
Georgia or Moldova a fully-fledged European voice; it is only in its capacity as a success story 
of institutional, legal and political transformation that can give AA countries legitimate 
positions allowing for influencing EU policies. 
